Abstract. There are many approaches to proving the correctness of application-layer protocols that are layered on secure transport protocols, such as TLS. One popular approach is verification by abstraction, in which the correctness of the application-layer protocol is proven under the assumption that the transport layer satisfies certain properties. Following this approach, we adapt the strand spaces model in order to analyse application-layer protocols that depend on unilaterally authenticating secure transport protocols, such as unilateral TLS. We develop proof rules that enable us to prove the correctness of application-layer protocols that use either unilateral or bilateral secure transport protocols, and illustrate them by proving the correctness of WebAuth, a single-sign-on protocol that makes extensive use of unilateral TLS.
Introduction
Many application-layer protocols make use of secure transport protocols, such as TLS [1] , to provide security guarantees, such as confidentiality and authentication. There are two different methods of verifying such application-layer protocols: either a combined protocol formed from the composition of the application protocol and the underlying secure transport protocol is derived, or the application-layer protocol is analysed assuming the transport protocol satisfies certain properties (i.e. verification by abstraction). In this paper we concentrate on using the second method as it offers a number of advantages. Proofs of correctness using this method are considerably simpler (as the combined protocols are often very large); further, since the proof is not dependent on a particular secure transport protocol, any secure transport protocol that provides the same properties can be used instead.
Most existing work [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] on verifying application-layer protocols by abstraction has focused on modelling the security guarantees provided by bilateral secure transport protocols, such as bilateral TLS, where each participant is authenticated to the other. However, many application-layer protocols, in particular those used on the web, are unable to make use of bilateral TLS, because each party must possess a public-key certificate. Therefore, web-based protocols almost exclusively make use of unilateral TLS. This alters the security guarantees to the server, as the client is no longer authenticated. However, the server can assume that all messages came from the same source, and that any messages the server sends will be received only by the source; further, the client's guarantees are unchanged. Despite its limitations, this means that unilateral TLS provides sufficient guarantees for many application-layer protocols.
If we wish to verify (by abstraction) application-layer protocols that make use of unilateral TLS, or other unilaterally authenticating secure transport protocols, we need to be able to formalise the security guarantees that the transport protocol provides. In this paper we investigate techniques for proving the correctness of such application-layer protocols. We build on the high-level strand spaces model [8, 9] , an extension of the original strand spaces model [10] .
Whilst the high-level strand spaces model is able to model the security guarantees provided by bilateral TLS accurately, it is unable to model those given by unilateral TLS. Unilaterally authenticating secure transport protocols differ from standard secure transport protocols in that the server cannot deduce anything about the identity of the client. Therefore, in this paper we enhance the model in order to capture precisely the authentication guarantees provided by unilaterally authenticating secure transport protocols.
These changes turned out to be less straightforward than we had anticipated due to how the session properties -which provide guarantees to a recipient that several messages were sent within the same session-were formalised. In particular, the session properties were previously defined by looking at the overall behaviour in a bundle which also made proofs difficult to construct and understand. Further, it did not permit multiple sessions between the same participants on the same strand; we modify the model to allow multiple sessions per strand. We present the new model in Section 2.
In Section 3 we develop some general proof rules that can be used for proving the correctness of application-layer protocols that use either unilateral or bilateral secure transport protocols. We then show the usefulness of these proof rules and the power of the new model by proving the correctness of a singlesign-on protocol, WebAuth [11] . In Section 4 we give an informal overview of WebAuth before formalising it in a strand space definition. In Section 5 we prove the correctness of WebAuth by proving three propositions that show what each principle can infer having completed a run; our analysis reveals a subtlety concerning the strength of authentication guarantees to the application server, and a requirement on the user that may not be obvious to all users. We sum up in Section 6.
Throughout this paper we do not consider issues such as the penetrator reordering messages within of a session, session corruptions or perfect forward secrecy. We see no issue with supporting them in a more complex model, should an application require it.
The High-Level Strand Spaces Model
We start by presenting the basics of the high-level strand spaces model. Definition 1. T names denotes the set of principals' names; it has two subsets: the regular names T reg names and the penetrator names T pen names . We further assume a value ?; we use this in our model when no name is authenticated (see below); we have T reg names ∩ T pen names = {?}. The set K of cryptographic keys has a distinct subset K sym of symmetric keys; the inverse of a key K ∈ K is denoted K −1 . The set T of atoms contains atomic messages, and includes T names ∪ K.
The set A of terms is defined as the closure of T under encryption (written as {m} K ) and concatenation (written t 1ˆt2 ). We assume an ordering relation over A, such that t 1 t 2 iff t 1 can be obtained from t 2 by a finite number of decryption and splitting operations.
The set A P ⊆ A of public terms is the set of terms that the penetrator initially knows. The sets T P = A P ∩ T and K P = A P ∩ K are the sets of atoms and keys initially known to the penetrator, respectively.
We now consider how to model application-layer messages. We consider a channel as an object that allows two participants to exchange messages: messages sent at one end of the channel are intended to be received at the other end. A fundamental property of TLS is that a principal is able to send or receive on a channel only if she has the relevant cryptographic keys; these are different in different channels, which prevents messages being replayed between sessions. A channel end encapsulates all such information that is required to communicate on a channel; as we abstract away from the details of the transport protocol, we treat channel ends as opaque values. For generality, we also consider channels (for protocols that are weaker than TLS) that do not provide such a separation between sessions; we denote the channel end by ? in such cases. Messages will be addressed by channel endpoints which consist of a name and a channel end.
Definition 2.
We assume a set of channel types, Channels, that contains a value ⊥ that represents the channel that provides no security guarantees. We write TLS C →S and TLS S →C to represent the channel types of a unilateral TLS connection from client to server and server to client respectively.
C denotes the set of channel ends. It has two subsets: penetrator channel ends, C pen , known to the penetrator; and regular channel ends, C reg , known only to regular agents; we have C reg ∩ C pen = {?}. The set of endpoints I is defined as T names × C; the set of regular endpoints I reg as T reg names × C reg ; and the set of penetrator endpoints I pen as T pen names × C pen . We denote a typical member, (A, ψ) ∈ I, as A ψ .
High-level terms model data being sent across the network. They are of the form (A ψ , B φ , m, c), representing an application-layer term m being sent from A's channel end ψ to B 's channel end φ along a channel of type c. Note that we abstract away from the implementation of the transport layer protocol, and just model the services it provides. The channel type restricts the permissible channel endpoints: for example, if the channel was a bilateral TLS channel then the sender and receiver endpoints A ψ and B φ could not contain ?, either as a name or a channel end; conversely, if the channel was a TLS C →S channel, where the sender's name is not authenticated, then the sender's channel end would be of the form ? ψ . If a strand makes exclusive use of bilateral protocols then the sender's name will typically be the same on each node and would be the name contained in her certificate.
Definition 3 (Based on [8])
. A high-level term is a tuple of the form σ(X ψ , Y φ , m, c) where: σ ∈ {+, −} represents the term being sent or received respectively; m ∈ A is the application-layer message; X ψ ∈ I is the claimed sender of m; Y φ ∈ I is the intended recipient of m; c ∈ Channels is the channel type along which the term is communicated. LetÂ denote the set of high-level terms. The set of finite sequences of high-level terms is denotedÂ * .
For example, +(? ψ , B φ , m, TLS C →S ) represents a message m sent along a unilateral TLS channel to an authenticated server, and +(A ψ , ? φ , m, TLS S →C ) represents a message m sent along a unilateral TLS channel from the server.
Using the above we now define a strand space as follows. Definition 4 (Based on [8] ). A strand space is a set Σ together with a trace mapping tr : Σ →Â * . Fix a strand space Σ .
1.
A node is a pair n = (st, i ) with st ∈ Σ and i ∈ {1 .. |tr (st)|}. We say that the node n belongs to the strand st. The set of nodes is denoted N. We define msg(n) = tr (st)(i ), and appmsg(n) = t where msg(n) = ±(A ψ , B φ , t, c).
There is an edge n 1 → n 2 iff msg(n 1 ) = +a and msg(n 2 ) = −a for some a.
This edge means that n 1 sends the term that is received by n 2 . 3. There is an edge n 1 ⇒ n 2 if and only if n 1 = (st, i ) and n 2 = (st, i + 1 ).
This edge expresses that n 1 is the immediate causal predecessor of n 2 on the strand st. The transitive closure of ⇒ is written ⇒ + . 4. An unsigned term t occurs in n ∈ N iff t appmsg(n). 5. If I is a set of unsigned terms then a node n ∈ N is an entry point for I iff there exists t ∈ I such that msg(n) = +t and whenever n ⇒ + n, msg(n ) / ∈ I . 6. Unsigned term t originates on n ∈ N iff n is an entry point for {t | t t }. 7. The function endpoints : Σ → P (I reg ) gives the set of endpoints that a regular strand uses. If n is a node on regular strand st with msg(n) = σ(X ψ , Y φ , m, c), then: if σ = + then X ψ ∈ endpoints(st); and if σ = − then Y φ ∈ endpoints(st). Similarly, ends : Σ → P (C reg ) gives the set of channel ends that a regular strand uses. Further, we assume that channel ends are partitioned by strand:
A bundle represents a possible real-world run of the protocol; it is a set of strands such that every message that is received by a strand is sent by another strand in the bundle.
is a subgraph of (N, → ∪ ⇒). Then B is a bundle if: 1. B is finite; 2. if n 2 ∈ N B and msg(n 2 ) is negative then there exists a unique n 1 ∈ N B such that n 1 → n 2 ; 3. if n 2 ∈ N B and n 1 ⇒ n 2 then n 1 ⇒ B n 2 ; 4. B is acyclic.
Fix a bundle B = (N B , → B ∪ ⇒ B ). A node n is in B, written n ∈ B, iff n ∈ N B . A strand st is in B iff any of its nodes is in N B . The B-height of a strand st is the largest i such that (st, i ) ∈ B. ≺ B is the transitive closure of → B ∪ ⇒ B , and B is the reflexive closure of ≺ B on N B . B is equivalent to a bundle B iff they have the same regular nodes.
The bundle below represents a client retrieving e-mail via a hypothetical protocol that makes use of unilateral TLS. It contains a client strand st C and a server strand st S , such that ends(st C ) = {ψ} and ends(st S ) = {φ}. All messages are sent over a unilateral TLS channel where the server is authenticated and the client is not; therefore, the client is identified as ? in every high-level term.
•
o o The above example also illustrates the necessity of channel ends. Without the channel ends, a message sent along a unilateral channel to the unauthenticated end would be represented by (S , ?, m, c). As this representation does not identify the recipient in any way it would not be possible to decide if the penetrator was allowed to receive the message. Therefore, if the channel type c provided a confidentiality guarantee, then this would admit false attacks. Hence we use channel ends to determine if the penetrator may read the contents of a message sent to an unauthenticated recipient, depending on whether the recipient endpoint is in I reg or I pen .
The penetrator for TLS-like protocols. We now consider how to model the capabilities of the penetrator. We start with messages that are sent over the unprotected channel ⊥ (i.e. not over any proper secure transport protocol). Clearly, we need to model the penetrator as the full Dolev-Yao penetrator and therefore we allow the penetrator to perform all the usual actions. Definition 6 (From [8] ). The application-layer penetrator strands are strands of the following form:
We now consider what the penetrator can do with messages sent over a secure transport channel. For ease of exposition we firstly consider a restricted model in which the only secure transport protocols are bilateral and unilateral TLS. Clearly, we must allow the penetrator to receive messages intended for him, and to send messages coming from himself. Definition 7 (Based on [8] ). The transport-layer penetrator strands for TLS-like protocols are of the following form, where c =⊥:
Note that the side conditions B φ ∈ I reg and A ψ ∈ I reg avoid redundancies caused by the penetrator sending a message to himself.
Observe that SD strands allow the penetrator to send messages to regular strands from the client end of a unilateral TLS connection, and to claim to be some honest agent A within the application layer message, e.g. +(? ψ , B φ , Aˆ. . ., TLS C →S ). However, from the server end of a unilateral TLS (or bilateral TLS) connection, he has to use a penetrator identity P ∈ T pen names , e.g. +(P ψ , ? φ , m, TLS S →C ), so couldn't claim to have an identity other than P within m. Similarly RV strands allow the penetrator to receive, at the client end, messages intended for regular agents, e.g. −(A ψ , ? φ , Bˆ. . ., TLS S →C ). But at the server end, such a message would have to have a penetrator identity as the recipient to allow a RV strand, e.g. −(?, P φ , Pˆ. . ., TLS C →S ). Further, the definition captures session properties of TLS-like protocols. The condition P ψ ∈ I pen ensures that if a regular strand receives two messages (? ψ , B φ , m, c) and (? ψ , B φ , m , c), either both came from another regular strand (if ? ψ ∈ I reg ), or both come from penetrator SD strands (if ? ψ ∈ I pen ). Thus we claim that this model accurately captures the penetrator's capabilities when using TLS-like protocols. As noted in the Introduction, we have not prohibited the penetrator from reordering messages but could do so if required. Generalising the secure transport protocol. For secure transport protocols that are weaker than TLS, there are many other ways for the penetrator to interact with transport messages. We consider how to generalise the above in order to model such protocols. In particular, we follow the approach taken in [3, 8] to define a more general penetrator that can also:
-Learn a message sent to an honest endpoint (i.e. overhear); -Fake a message as coming from an honest endpoint; -Hijack a message, redirecting it to a different endpoint, and/or re-ascribing it as coming from a different endpoint (changing name and/or channel end).
Definition 8 (Based on [8] ). The transport-layer penetrator strands are SD and RV strands, as above, and strands of the following forms, where c =⊥:
The restrictions on ? in HJ strands prevent a unilateral protocol from being transformed into a bilateral protocol, or vice-versa. We now define channel properties that restrict the penetrator's behaviour. There are many different channel properties. We consider only the most important; other definitions could be made if specialised applications require them.
The first property we consider is confidentiality. Clearly LN strands should be prohibited on confidential channels. However, this is not sufficient: suppose A ψ sends a message to B φ along a confidential channel c; if the penetrator could redirect the message to I χ ∈ I pen , then he would be able to do a receive and thus can obtain the message indirectly; we therefore prohibit such behaviours.
Definition 9 (Confidential). Let channel c satisfy C. Then in any highlevel bundle there are no LN strands on c, or HJ strands of the form
Many application-layer protocols require some guarantee that messages came from a certain source and that they were intended for a particular destination, i.e. that the channel is an authenticated one. Clearly, this means that fake strands must be prohibited on this channel. Furthermore, redirects and re-ascribes must also be prohibited since these allow messages to be sent to unintended destinations and for messages to have incorrect purported senders respectively. Definition 10 (Authenticated). Let channel c satisfy A. Then no high-level bundle contains any FK or HJ strands on c.
The conjunction of the A and the C properties is known as AC. Clearly, the only penetrator strands allowed are SD and RV strands and therefore, as discussed earlier, it corresponds to the security guarantees modelled by TLS.
Proof Rules
In this section we give proof rules that are of use when proving the correctness of protocols. The first, given a message that is purported to have been sent by a regular agent, allows the existence of a corresponding regular node to be deduced.
Authentication Proof Rule. Let B be a high-level bundle and n ∈ B be a node on a regular strand st such that msg(n) = −(A ψ , B φ , m, c) for some A ψ = ? ? , B φ , m and c. Then, providing c satisfies A, and A ψ ∈ I reg , there must exist a regular node n such that n → n and msg(n ) = +(A ψ , B φ , m, c). Further, if φ = ? and c additionally satisfies C 2 then every n such that n → n lies on the same strand as n.
Proof. Consider the node n such that n → n and suppose for a contradiction that n is a penetrator node; then as A ψ ∈ I reg it follows that the only type of penetrator strand that n could be on is a FK. However, these are prohibited by the assumption that c satisfies A. Therefore n is a regular node. Thus, as n → n, it immediately follows that msg(n ) = + (A ψ , B φ , m, c) .
Further, suppose φ = ?, c satisfies AC and let n be a node such that n → n . Thus, msg(n ) = −(A ψ , B φ , m, c) and therefore, as B φ ∈ I reg and c satisfies AC, n must be a regular node on a regular strand st . Hence, φ ∈ ends(st ) and therefore Equation 1 can be applied to st and st to deduce that st = st. Hence n lies on the same strand as n, as required.
The second proof rule extends the above rule by not only proving the existence of the regular node, but also proving that it lies on the same strand as another regular node (providing the channel ends match).
Session Proof Rule. Let B be a high-level bundle and n ∈ B be a node on a regular strand st such that msg(n) = −(A ψ
Proof. This follows from the previous rule by Equation 1 .
The third proof rule is mainly applicable to unilaterally authenticating secure transport channels. We first review the notion of safe atoms from [9] .
Definition 11. The set of terms deducible by the penetrator, denoted A * P , is defined as {t | ∃t ∈ A P ∧ t t }.
Definition 12 (From [9] ). Let B be a high-level bundle. We say that a term t is sent confidentially in a high-level term (A ψ , B φ , m, c) iff t m, c satisfies C, and A, B / ∈ T pen names . Definition 13 (From [9] ). The set of safe atoms in a high-level bundle B is defined inductively by M(B) = i M i (B) where:
where a ∈ X i+1 (B) iff a / ∈ A * P and if a occurs in a high-level term m then either a is sent confidentially in m or a occurs only within the set of terms
Lemma 14 (From [9] ). Let B be a bundle and a a safe atom in B; then for every equivalent bundle B there is no node n ∈ B such that msg(n) = (?, ?, a, ⊥).
Authentication via Confidentiality Proof Rule. Let B be a bundle and a be a safe atom in B. Furthermore, let n ∈ B be a regular node such that msg(n) = −(A ψ , B φ , m, c) for some A ψ , B φ , m and c, such that m = . . .ˆaˆ. . ., and c satisfies AC. Then there exists a regular node n ∈ B such that n → n.
Proof. Let n be the node such that n → n. Suppose for a contradiction that n is a penetrator node. Then as c satisfies AC it follows that n must lie on a SD strand and thus there must exist nodes n 1 and n 2 such that n 2 → n 1 ⇒ n and msg(n 2 ) = +(?, ?, m, ⊥). Hence there exists an equivalent bundle B that contains the same regular nodes, together with extra S strands to extract a from m to obtain a node n such that msg(n ) = (?, ?, a, ⊥). However, a is safe so this contradicts Lemma 14. Therefore n must be a regular node.
The WebAuth Protocol
In this section we introduce the WebAuth protocol and describe some of the unusual issues that arise when verifying web-based protocols. Then we formally define a strand space for the WebAuth protocol, and state our assumptions. WebAuth [11] is a single-sign on protocol that is designed to allow users to login to multiple websites through a central authentication server, meaning that only one username and password per user is required. It differs from other single-sign on protocols such as OpenID [12] in that it requires shared keys to be established between the website and the authentication server prior to authentication of users.
Three principals participate in a WebAuth session: the User Agent (UA), is the web browser that makes requests for the user; the Application Server (AS ) is the server that the user wishes to access; the Login Server (LS ) is the server responsible for authenticating the user. These principals communicate via HTTP [13] or HTTPS [14] requests, and pass data to each other by embedding tokens in the redirect URLs. For example, when the AS redirects the UA to the LS , the redirect URL will be of the form https://LS /?RT=rtok ;ST=stok where rtok and stok are tokens. The AS and LS also use HTTP cookies to store tokens to allow the user agent to re-authenticate on subsequent requests.
In this paper we prove the correctness of the initial sign on mode of WebAuth, which assumes that the user is not already authenticated. The protocol in its most simplified form is as follows:
A RequestToken encapsulates the original request that the user made. The ServiceToken contains configuration information for the LS , enabling it to be stateless. The ProxyToken allows a user to authenticate again without supplying her password (i.e. repeat authentication), whilst the IdToken is a temporary token created by the LS for the AS that details who the user is. The user exchanges this temporary token for a AppToken by passing it to the AS .
WebAuth's token encoding is complicated, so we use a simplified version; essentially the same proof would hold for the full protocol. We encode a token by {tagˆdata} key where key ∈ K sym and tag is a tag. The protocol can be described as follows, where SK (A) denotes a symmetric key that is secret to A ∈ T names and Sh AS LS denotes the key shared between AS and LS . WebAuth mandates the use of HTTPS between LS and either AS or UA, but merely recommends that HTTPS is used between UA and AS . Clearly, if HTTPS is not used between UA and AS then there are a number of attacks whereby the intruder intercepts various tokens. Thus, we assume that all messages are sent over unilateral TLS, with UA unauthenticated.
When modelling security protocols it is generally assumed that the participants are able to perform checks on the values they receive to ensure adherence to the protocol. For example, a UA may be expected to compare the value of r received in message 6 to the one sent in message 1. However, these checks are not possible if the role is being assumed by a general-purpose web browser. In particular this means that the user will not check if the request and the AS match between messages 1 and 7, or if the request and service tokens match.
Further, the servers are stateless. For example, the AS stores no state between the first two messages and the last two; we will therefore model these two exchanges using two distinct strands (and similarly for the LS).
We now define the strand space corresponding to the protocol. In the following: ψ i denotes channel ends used by the user; φ i denotes channel ends used by the LS and AS ; r i denotes requests; stok , rtok , atok , ptok , idtok denote service, request, application, proxy and identity tokens respectively. Further, we assume that the set of atoms, T , includes requests, responses, the token tags, passwords and the login form (denoted by LoginForm). In order to prove the correctness of WebAuth we require a number of assumptions: 1. the penetrator does not initially know any key shared between two honest agents; 2. honest application servers are configured with the correct service tokens and keys; 3. the only non-atomic terms known to the penetrator are service tokens for dishonest servers; 4. the penetrator does not initially know passwords of honest users. Further, we require that the user does not reveal her password except to the appropriate login server; i.e. the user is not tricked into giving her password away to the penetrator. In practice this means that the user, before divulging her password, should verify the LS by ensuring that the domain name matches the expected name; this requirement may not be obvious to all users. This assumption is formalised in the definition of the strand space: in message 6 on a User strand, (? ψ3 , LS φ3 , Uˆpasswd LS (U )ˆrtok 2ˆs tok 2 , TLS C →S ), the identities of the recipient and of the server in passwd LS (U ) are required to be equal.
The Guarantees
We start by proving that shared keys and passwords are safe. We now analyse what the user can deduce having completed a full run of the protocol. The proposition and its proof are illustrated in Figure 1 . Proposition 18. Let B be a bundle from Σ and let
be a regular strand of B-height 8. Then provided LS ∈ T reg names : 1. If AS ∈ T reg names then there exists a strand st
2. There exists a strand st Proof. Let st U be such a strand; we prove each of the points in turn as follows:
1. Assume that AS ∈ T reg names . As TLS S →C satisfies A, by the Authentication Rule there must exist a regular node n such that n → st U (2 ), and thus that msg(n) = msg(st U (2 )). By inspection this can only be the second node on an AS1 strand st 
Again, as TLS
S →C satisfies AC and since LS φ2 ∈ I reg it follows, by the Authentication Rule, that there must exist a regular node n such that n → st U (4 ), and thus that msg(n) = msg(st U (4 )). By inspection this can only be the second node on a LS1 strand st 5. This follows from part 1 and part 3. 6. Note that TLS S →C satisfies C and therefore, provided AS ∈ T reg names , resp is sent confidentially in st 2 AS (2 ). Therefore, it immediately follows that resp occurs safely providing resp / ∈ A P . 7. This follows immediately from Equation 1 as disjoint regular strands use disjoint channel ends.
We now consider the guarantees to the login server. We require a lemma that shows that only correct keys can be embedded in service tokens. The proof is in Appendix A. names then there exists a strand (writing * for values that are arbitrary) st U ∈ User [U , AS , * , LS , ψ 1 , ψ 2 , ψ 3 , * , φ 1 , φ 2 , φ 3 , * , r 1 , * , * , rt, rt, stok 1 , stok 1 , * , * , * ] of B-height at least 5, and there exists a strand st
The proof uses the following proof rule from [9] , based on [15] .
Incoming Authentication Test. Suppose that there is a negative node n 1 ∈ B such that msg(n 1 ) = (A ψ , B φ , m, c), t = {t 0 } K m and K ∈ M(B). If t / ∈ A * P then there exists a regular node n 1 ≺ B n 1 such that t originates on n 1 .
Proof sketch of Proposition 20. 1. Using the fact that k = Sh AS LS is safe, the Incoming Authentication Test applied to st 2 LS (1 ), can be used to show the node that created the request token must be regular; hence an appropriate AS1 strand exists. 2. By the Authentication via Confidentiality Rule, using the fact that passwd LS (U ) is safe. 3. All participants are honest, so U and LS agree on where the request token originates from, which must therefore be the AS1 strand from part 1. The full proof is in Appendix A.
Lastly, we consider what an application server (in particular, an AS2 ) can deduce having completed a run of the protocol.
Proposition 21. Let B be a bundle from Σ , AS , LS ∈ T reg names and st 2 AS ∈ AS2 [AS , U , LS , ψ 4 , φ 4 , r 2 , resp] be a regular strand of B-height 2. Then:
1. There exists a strand st
names then AS = AS and there exists a strand st Item 2c reveals a subtlety of the protocol: the application server has no guarantee that the user wishes to authenticate herself to it. For example, suppose there are two application servers, one dishonest, P , and one honest, AS . Further, suppose the user wishes to access a resource on P ; when P redirects the user to the Login Server, rather than P sending his own service and request token, P can send a service token for AS and a request token for a resource r on AS . This means that the user, after successfully authenticating to LS , would be redirected to AS and would inadvertently request r . Clearly, this could be dangerous if r is a request that causes data to be modified.
Conclusions
In this paper we have modified the high-level strand spaces model to model the security guarantees provided by unilaterally authenticating secure transport protocols. Further, the use of channel ends allows us to capture fine-grained session properties. This alteration makes proofs easier to develop and comprehend compared to the model of [8, 9] .
We have also provided general proof rules which, when used in conjunction with the Authentication Tests of [9] , give a general proof strategy for proving the correctness of application layer protocols that use either unilateral or bilateral secure transport protocols. In particular, given a strand st, the proof rules from Section 3 can be applied to show the existence of strands that directly send to st. This is in contrast to the Authentication Tests, which can be used to show the existence of strands that send indirectly to st (i.e. via another strand).
We demonstrated the model by proving the correctness of a single-sign on protocol, WebAuth. Whilst this analysis did not reveal any major attacks it did reveal a requirement on the user to check that she has been redirected to the correct Login Server, and one subtlety, that the application server has no guarantee that the user wishes to authenticate herself to it.
Another problem that arises when verifying protocols where one of the participants is a web browser is that the web browser does not check if messages are skipped or reordered. For example, there is nothing to prevent a dishonest application server from sending a message 4 rather than a message 2. In principle, it would be possible to adapt the proofs to model this behaviour, but the proofs would be rather intricate and uninteresting.
Related work. The work that is closest to ours is that of Mödersheim and Viganò [7] . They define a model, the Ideal Channel Model (ICM), that abstracts away from how the channels are implemented. They then consider how to model the guarantees given by unilaterally authenticating secure transport protocols (or secure pseudonymous channels). In their model they specify confidential, authentic and secure channels, which roughly correspond to C, A and AC respectively. The primary difference between the two approaches is that whilst both formalisms permit analysis of protocols that use bilateral or unilateral transport protocols, ours also allows protocols that do not group messages into sessions to be analysed (i.e. by letting the channel end be ?). Another difference is that they address unauthenticated clients using pseudonyms rather than our name and channel end combination, which we use to enable bilateral and unilateral protocols to be considered together more uniformly. We also think that this clarifies the model and makes it clearer what is occurring at the transport layer. Further, they do not consider session properties.
One interesting difference is in how the proofs of the application layer protocols are developed. The formalism of Mödersheim and Viganò requires the prover to explicitly detail what constitutes an attack. This contrasts with our formalism where the exact correctness properties are deduced during the proof; we believe that this offers an advantage as there may be many small, subtle, correctness conditions.
In [16] Groß and Mödersheim consider vertical protocol composition, which occurs, for example, when a TLS connection is layered on a secure VPN connection. In particular, they develop a composition result that proves that, providing each protocol satisfies certain conditions, arbitrary composition of the set of protocols introduces no new attacks.
Future work. In this paper we considered how to prove the correctness of application-layer protocols that are layered upon secure transport protocols. Clearly we need to justify the correctness of the model in order to ensure the proofs are valid. In particular we need to prove that unilateral TLS satisfies AC, which could be done by adapting the proof for bilateral TLS from [17] . Further, in order to show that the model is sound we need to relate the abstract model to the concrete model where the transport protocol and application-layer protocol are combined together; this could be done by adapting the proof from [18] .
In order to make our technique more applicable it would be interesting to consider methods by which it could be automated. One approach to this problem would be to adapt the tool CPSA [19] , which is able to analyse protocols in the standard strand spaces model. Alternatively, since proofs using our model are largely mechanical we believe that a proof assistant would be easy to develop.
It would also be interesting to consider what further enhancements could be made to the penetrator model to enable additional secure transport properties to be developed. For example, we may wish to model secure transport protocols that ensure messages are received in the correct order. 2. This follows immediately from a trivial extension of Proposition 20 to a User strand of B-height 7 (we need to extend the User strand to ensure agreement between the User and LS2 on r 2 and r 2 ).
